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Heightened Fiduciary Duties in Closely
Held Corporations: Donahue Revisited
STEVEN N. BULLOCH*
In 1975, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court decided the land-
mark case of Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England,
Inc.' The decision challenged the assumptions under which closely
held corporations operated. Prior to Donahue, the rights and liabilities
of the majority shareholders in a closely held corporation vis-a-vis
the minority were defined reasonably well. Donahue, however, changed
the law applicable to closely held corporations. After Donahue, any
maneuver by a majority shareholder that in any way impinged upon
the rights of minority shareholders or that benefited only the majori-
ty shareholders was subject to attack by the minority. Donahue was
used by minority shareholders in a variety of situations, sometimes
successfully. The decision even was used against minority shareholders
whose actions harmed the majority shareholders.2
This article will demonstrate that Donahue was a well-reasoned deci-
sion that should be extended. To effectuate that purpose, the author
will trail the impact of Donahue on closely held corporations by con-
sidering the Donahue progeny. Situations in which Donahue was not
applied thereafter will be examined, with the author evaluating whether
that decision should have been followed. Before discussing the im-
pact of Donahue, however, that case first must be explored.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio; B.A.
1968, Harvard College; J.D. 1974, Case Western Reserve University.
1. 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505 (1975).
2. See infra notes 62-81 and accompanying text.
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Donahue: OPENING THE DOOR FOR MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS
Donahue involved a small electrotype corporation, the stock of which
was owned by two families, the Rodds and the Donahues.3 The com-
pany originally had been a subsidiary of Royal Electrotype Company.'
Its stock, however, had been purchased by Harry Rodd, the person
primarily responsible for the success of the company,' and by Joseph
Donahue, a long-time employee who was involved in the operation
of the company, but who never really had participated in the
"'management' aspect of the business." 6
At one time, Rodd owned eighty percent of the outstanding stock,
while Joseph Donahue owned twenty percent.7 As Harry Rodd grew
older, he sold or gave stock to his children and also brought them
into the business. The Rodd family continued to control a majority
of the stock in the corporation.'
In 1970, when Harry Rodd reached the age of 77, he and his sons
decided he should retire. As part of his retirement plan, the Rodd
family decided that his remaining shares would be purchased by the
corporation. 9 To assure that the minority shareholders would have
no grounds for complaint, the parties pegged the purchase price of
the stock at book and liquidation value.' 0
3. 367 Mass. 578, 583, 328 N.E.2d 505, 509-10 (1975).
4. Id. at 581, 328 N.E.2d at 509.
5. See id. at 582, 328 N.E.2d at 509.
6. Id. at 581, 328 N.E.2d at 509.
7. Id. at 582, 328 N.E.2d at 509.
8. See id. at 582, 328 N.E.2d at 510.
9. Id. at 583, 328 N.E.2d at 510.
10. See id. The book value of shares in a corporation with only one class of stock is
determined by subtracting the total corporate liabilities from total assets and dividing this figure
by the number of shares outstanding. See Schaffer v. Below, 278 F.2d 619, 625 (3d Cir. 1960).
This value is not necessarily an accurate reflection of the true value of the shares for a number
of reasons. First, under this valuation method, the assets of a corporation are not revalued
periodically, but rather are shown at cost less depreciation. Thus, increases in the value of
individual assets, due to inflation or other reasons, are ignored. Second, this approach fails
to consider the value of the enterprise as a going concern but rather considers only the aggregate
value of the individual corporate assets. Book value nevertheless is one method that has some
reliability for valuing an interest in a corporation. See generally M. HOOD, A. KURTZ & P.
SHORS, CLOSELY HELD CORPORATIONS IN BusINEss AND ESTATE PLANNING §9.4 (1982) (indicating
problems with book value but recognizing it as a valid starting point for determining share
valuation). The liquidation value of shares is based on the price that the assets of the enterprise
would bring if the enterprise ceased doing business and the assets were sold. After subtracting
total liabilities, the liquidating value per share is determined by dividing the remaining figure
by the number of shares outstanding. As is true with book value, liquidating value per share
normally does not reflect the true value of the shares since no adjustment is made for the
value of the enterprise as a going concern. This method also tends to produce a low value
because it assumes that sales upon liquidation will require some urgency and, therefore, the
price to be obtained for some of the assets will be depressed. This method, however, gives
the absolute bottom value for a business below which liquidation, rather than sale as a going
concern, is preferable.
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The transaction occurred, apparently without the knowledge of the
Donahues. " After learning of the repurchase they requested that their
shares also be repurchased at the same price per share as was paid
to Harry Rodd.' 2 Their request, however, was rejected by the
corporation. ' 3
The Donahues then brought suit. They argued that the decision
of the Rodd family to cause the corporation to repurchase only Harry's
stock, and not to offer this same opportunity to them, was a breach
of the fiduciary duties owed by the majority to the minority
shareholders.' 4 The trial court ruled in favor of the defendants15
because the Rodds and their attorneys had pegged the repurchase price
at the book and liquidation value of the stock. 6 The transaction,
therefore, seemed fair to the corporation and the minority shareholders,
who apparently would not be affected adversely by the transaction.' 7
The trial court applied the prevailing rule, which approved transac-
tions fair to the corporation." Massachusetts followed this rule at
the time Donahue was decided.' 9
The Massachusetts Supreme Court, however, declined to follow the
prevailing law and reversed, stating that participants in closely held
11. 367 Mass. 578, 584, 328 N.E.2d 505, 510 (1975).
12. Id. at 584, 328 N.E.2d at 511.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 585, 328 N.E.2d at 511.
15. Id. at 580, 328 N.E.2d at 508.
16. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
17. Although book and liquidating values are not likely to reflect accurately the fair market
value of stock, a sufficiently close relationship exists between the fair market value and values
arrived at through the use of these methods to at least raise a presumption of reliability. See
supra note 10.
18. Since the Rodd family represented the corporation as purchaser and because one of
the family members, Harry Rodd, was the seller, this transaction created a conflict of interest
on the part of the Rodd family. This is because the family's duty to the corporation to obtain
the lowest price for the stock conflicted with the family's self-interest in obtaining the highest
price for the shares of a family member. Under the common law prevailing in most jurisdic-
tions today, a transaction fair to the corporation will not be struck down. See, e.g., In re
Westec Corporation, 434 F.2d 195, 202 (5th Cir. 1970). Applying Texas law, the court stated:
"because of his fiduciary obligation, an officer's contract with his corporation for his personal
gain will be subjected to the scrutiny of the courts. It will not be upheld unless the officer
shows that it is fair and made in good faith." Id. In many jurisdictions, statutory resolutions
of this problem have superseded the common law. Statutory solutions generally are less protec-
tive of the interests of the corporation than is the common law. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. VIII §144 (1983). This statute provides that transactions tainted with conflict of interest
are not invalid if: (1) approved by a vote of the disinterested directors; (2) ratified by the
shareholders (including interested shareholders); or (3) fair to the corporation. Id. Under the
Delaware statute, therefore, a transaction that is not necessarily fair to the corporation may
be upheld by a vote of the shareholders, the outcome of which could be decided by an interested
party who owns sufficient shares.
19. Spiegel v. Beacon Participations, Inc., 297 Mass. 398, 8 N.E.2d 895 (1937).
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corporations owe heightened fiduciary duties to each other.2" The court
held that this corporation was a closely held corporation2' and that
the decision to repurchase the stock of one of the majority
shareholders, without affording that same opportunity to the minori-
ty shareholders, breached those heightened fiduciary duties.2 2 The
analysis by the court of each of these points is instructive.
A. Defining a Closely Held Corporation
Commentators and courts always have grappled with the problem
of defining a closely held corporation.23 Obviously, the line that
separates closely held from mid-sized corporations cannot be drawn
with certainty. In Donahue, the court advanced two approaches to
this problem. First, the court said that a corporation is "closely held"
if it has (1) a small number of shareholders, (2) no ready market
for the corporate stock, and (3) substantial majority shareholder par-
ticipation in the operation of the enterprise. 21 Second, the court
analogized a closely held corporation to a partnership, pointing out
that closely held corporations are often called "incorporated partner-
ships" because the internal relationships of the participants are similar
to those of partners while the enterprise is clothed with benefits peculiar
to a corporation, such as limited liability for the participants.25
B. Heightened Duties in Closely Held Corporations
Once a closely held corporation is defined, the next inquiry focuses
on why majority shareholders in closely held corporations owe
heightened fiduciary duties to the minority. The court offered two
reasons. First, minority shareholders in a closely held corporation tend
to have a greater stake in the venture than do their counterparts in
a publicly held corporation.26 This is an empirical assumption that
is probably true, but for which the court offered no support.
Second, a minority shareholder in a closely held corporation has
20. 367 Mass. 578, 593, 328 N.E.2d 505, 515 (1975).
21. Id. at 601, 328 N.E.2d at 519-20.
22. See id. at 599, 328 N.E.2d at 518-19.
23. Israels, The Close Corporation and The Law, 33 CORNELL L.Q. 488, 491 (1948).
Professor Israels stated that "no satisfactory all-purpose definition of a close corporation ap-
pears ever to have been worked out, a fact which itself has led to some of the confusion
in the cases, springing from the willingness or unwillingness of particular courts to grant legal
recognition to the clearly separate economic concept of the close corporation." Id.
24. 367 Mass. 578, 585-86, 328 N.E.2d 505, 511 (1975).
25. Id. at 586-87, 328 N.E.2d at 512.
26. See id. at 590-91, 328 N.E.2d at 514.
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no ready market for his shares.27 This, of course, is one of the fac-
tors utilized in defining a closely held corporation. It is true for a
number of reasons. For instance, unlike a public corporation, no
organized market exists for shares in a closely held corporation. Also, in-
terests in closely held corporations are notoriously difficult to value,28
and interests often are impaired by transferability restrictions. 29 Fur-
thermore, transferability of stock of a minority shareholder in a closely
held corporation is diminished when relationships between majority
and minority shareholders are less than cordial. No informed person
would put himself in the position of the minority under these
circumstances.30
Given these two assumptions, the court stated that the majority
can inflict severe harm upon minority shareholders in a closely held
corporation. 3 The majority, for instance, can utilize a variety of
schemes to "freeze out" the minority.3 2 In particular, the majority
may use its power to control the board of directors and deny the
minority employment in the corporation.33 Denying employment can
dry up the minority shareholder's investment return because most close-
ly held corporations pay salaries, instead of dividends, to distribute
27. Id. at 591, 328 N.E.2d at 514.
28. See M. HOOD, A. KuR~rz & P. SHoRs, supra note 10, §9.0.
29. Absent provisions in the articles, bylaws or other document, shares of stock in a
corporation are freely transferable. Fayard v. Fayard, 293 So. 2d 421, 423 (Miss. 1974).
"Corporate shares of stock are universally considered personal property and in the absence
of valid restrictions the owner has an inherent right incident to ownership to sell and transfer
at his will." Id. Free transferability of ownership interests is a characteristic that distinguishes
corporations from other types of business organizations, such as partnerships. In closely held
corporations, the free ownership transferability of a typical corporation generally is not viewed
favorably by the participants, who work with one another in the day-to-day management of
the enterprise and therefore are concerned with the compatibility and competence of fellow
shareholders. Ownership interests in closely held corporations frequently are subject to share
transfer restrictions because of this concern. These restrictions can take on a variety of forms,
but rights of first refusal on behalf of the corporation or remaining shareholders and buy-out
agreements are most common. A right of first refusal gives the corporation or remaining
shareholders the option to purchase a departing shareholder's shares before he can transfer
them to a third party. Under a buy-out agreement, the departing shareholder, on the one hand,
is obligated to sell his shares to the corporation or the remaining shareholders at a certain
price upon the occurrence of a certain event, and the corporation or remaining shareholders,
on the other hand, are obligated to purchase the shares for that price when the event occurs.
Both types of restrictions are beneficial to the remaining shareholders because they prevent
the departing shareholder's shares from falling into the hands of unwanted outsiders. Only
a buy-out agreement, however, is beneficial to the departing shareholder, who is provided with
a market for his shares. See 2 F. O'NEaL, CLosE Cosu'oRAroNs §§7.01-7.29 (2d ed. supp.
1984) for a general discussion of share transfer restrictions.
30. Orchard v. Covelli, 590 F. Supp. 1548, 1557 (W.D. Pa. 1984). "Dissension within
the close corporation tends to make the minority interest even more unattractive to a prospec-
tive purchaser." Id.
31. See 367 Mass. 578, 592, 328 N.E.2d 505, 515 (1978).
32. Id. at 588-89, 328 N.E.2d at 513.
33. Id.
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funds to their shareholders.34 Unless the statutory norm of majority
rule were altered when the corporation was formed,3" the minority
shareholder also could lose his position as director or officer of the
corporation through the actions of the majority. Moreover, as men-
tioned previously, the minority shareholder has no recourse because
a ready market in which to sell his shares does not exist. Thus, given
the substantial impact that the majority shareholder can have on the
wealth and general well-being of the minority shareholder, heightened
fiduciary duties are justified.
The application of heightened duties to the repurchase of a ma-
jority shareholder's stock is not self-evident. A corporate repurchase
is not the classic "squeeze out" as just described.36 The Donahue
court nevertheless applied the concept to repurchases, concluding that
a minority shareholder had to be afforded an equal opportunity to
resell shares to the corporation." The court reasoned that the repur-
chase provided only the majority with a market for its shares in a
situation in which, by definition, no ready market for the shares exists38
and that the repurchase afforded only the majority shareholder ac-
cess to corporate assets.3 9 The court concluded, therefore, that the
Donahues, as minority shareholders, had to be given an equal oppor-
tunity to resell their shares." Subsequent decisions have refined the
sweeping doctrine advanced in Donahue.
34. As long as salaries are reasonable in amount they are deductible as an ordinary and
necessary business expense by the corporation. I.R.C. §162(a)(1) (1982). Dividends, on the other
hand, are not deductible. I F. O'NEAL, supra note 29, §2.04. Since participants in closely held
corporations generally are involved in the day-to-day operation of the corporation and because
salaries are deductible by the corporation, distributions to participants are made through the
payment of salaries rather than dividends.
35. In almost all jurisdictions today, ordinary decisions of the shareholders and directors
are determined by a vote of a majority of a quorum. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE §602; DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. VIII, §216. One device for protecting minority shareholders is to place a high
vote requirement in the articles or bylaws when the corporation is formed. This can be done
because the statutory norm of majority rule is not immutable. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
VIII §141(b). "The vote of the majority of the directors present at a meeting at which a quorum
is present shall be the act of the board of directors unless the certificate of incorporation or
the bylaws shall require a vote of a greater number." Id. Utilization of a high vote require-
ment is a technique often used in closely held corporations and is effective in protecting minority
interests. See Roach v. Bynum, 403 So. 2d 187, 192 (Ala. 1981). "The requirement of unanimity
or high quorum/vote for shareholder and director action is one of the most effective methods
of protecting the interests of the minority shareholders and preventing the majority from 'squeez-
ing out' the minority." Id.
36. No minority shareholder was deprived of a return on his investment or of his share
in the control of the corporation. Rather, only the majority, and not the minority, was given
a benefit, the repurchase of stock.
37. See 367 Mass. 578, 598-99, 328 N.E.2d 505, 518 (1975).
38. Id. at 599, 328 N.E.2d at 518.
39. Id. at 599, 328 N.E.2d at 518-19.
40. Alternate relief in the form of rescission of the transaction between Harry Rodd and
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Ti LAw AFTER Donahue
The Massachusetts Supreme Court refined Donahue in Wilkes v.
Springside Nursing Home, Inc.4" Wilkes involved a classic squeeze-
out situation. Wilkes and three others formed a corporation to own
and operate a nursing home. 42 The enterprise was a typical closely
held corporation because all four shareholders were to be involved
in the management of the business. 43 The business operated smoothly
until a controversy arose over the price that Quinn, one of the
shareholders, should pay for some land he sought to purchase from
the corporation." Wilkes convinced the other two shareholders to hold
out for a price higher than Quinn desired to pay. 5 This infuriated
Quinn and thereafter the relationship of Wilkes with Quinn, as well
as with the other two shareholders, deteriorated. 4 The squeeze out
then began. First, employment of Wilkes with the corporation was
terminated by the other three shareholders through their control of
the board of directors. 7 Then, at the next shareholders meeting, Wilkes
lost his position on the board. 8
At this point, Wilkes became an outsider. He no longer received
any return on his investment because the corporation distributed funds
to the shareholders through salaries, rather than dividends,4 9 and he
no longer was employed by the corporation. Furthermore, he could
no longer participate in the control of the corporation since he had
lost his positions as an officer and director. Wilkes could not sell
his stock because no organized market existed for his stock and no
rational person would purchase a minority interest in a closely held
corporation in which the minority was feuding with the majority.50
As a result of their squeeze out, Wilkes filed suit, alleging that
the majority shareholders had breached their fiduciary duties to him.'
In Wilkes, the Massachusetts Supreme Court defined more carefully
the corporation also was granted. Id. at 578, 603, 328 N.E.2d 505, 520-21 (1975); see Comolli
v. Comolli, 241 Ga. 471, 246 S.E.2d 278 (1978) (result similar to Donahue).
41. 370 Mass. 842, 353 N.E.2d 657 (1976).
42. Id. at 844, 353 N.E.2d at 659.
43. See id. at 845 n.8, 353 N.E.2d at 660 n.8.
44. Id. at 846, 353 N.E.2d at 660.
45. Id.
46. See id. at 846-47, 353 N.E.2d at 660.
47. See id. at 847, 353 N.E.2d at 661.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 850 n.13, 353 N.E.2d at 662 n.13.
50. The group of remaining shareholders was the one potential buyer for the stock. The
price they were willing to pay Wilkes, of course, was extremely low, and the court found that
forcing Wilkes to sell his shares to them "may have been at the heart of [their] plan." Id.
at 852, 353 N.E.2d at 664.
51. Id. at 843, 353 N.E.2d at 658-59.
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the duties that majority shareholders owe to the minority. The court
recognized that the majority must be accorded some flexibility in
operating the corporation because it controlled the enterprise and thus
had a right to maximize corporate efficiency.12
The Wilkes court developed a balancing test to accommodate the
interests of the majority, and minority shareholders in the corporation."
Under this test, the initial burden is placed on the majority to
demonstrate some legitimate corporate purpose for taking actions that
harm the minority shareholder."4 If the majority demonstrates a cor-
porate purpose, the minority then must demonstrate how this cor-
porate purpose could have been accomplished through alternative
means less harmful to the minority shareholders."5 If this is done,
the court then must weigh the legitimate corporate purpose "against
the practicality of [the suggested] less harmful alternative." 6
In Wilkes, the judicial inquiry was simple because the majority had
shown no legitimate corporate reasons for terminating plaintiff's
employment." Testimony taken at trial had shown that Wilkes had
been a competent employee and had done nothing to indicate that
he was acting other than in the best interests of the corporation."5
The actions of the majority apparently were designed to force Wilkes
to sell his stock in the corporation at an unreasonably low price."
The development of the balancing test in Wilkes is sensible primarily
because majority shareholders should have some ability to maneuver
when running an enterprise. The test, however, does emphasize astute
fact presentation at the trial court level. Indeed, in Wilkes, the ma-
jority should have been able to present some arguably reasonable
justification for its actions, and this would have made the task of
the court substantially more difficult. 60
52. Id. at 851, 353 N.E.2d at 663.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 852, 353 N.E.2d at 664.
59. See supra note 50.
60. See Zidell v. Zidell, Inc., 277 Or. 413, 560 P.2d 1086 (1977) (an example of a more
conservative approach to a situation similar to Wilkes). In Zidell, one shareholder had resigned
his position with the closely held corporation after a dispute with the majority shareholders.
He also lost his directorship with the corporation. He later sued the majority shareholders
arguing that they had breached their fiduciary duties to him by paying unreasonably low dividends,
while at the same time paying themselves unreasonably high salaries. The court, ignoring that
the corporation was closely held, employed the business judgment rule in reviewing the decision
of the majority regarding the amount of the dividends. Use of the business judgment rule
almost always guarantees that defendants will prevail because under the rule, "any plausible
business reasons supportive of the [defendant's] decision" will suffice. 277 Or. at 419, 560
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Wilkes involved the situation in which the heightened fiduciary duty
is most compelling." In other situations, however, the application of
the concept is less certain. Another Massachusetts case, Smith v. Atlan-
tic Properties, Inc.,62 involves one of these more difficult and less
compelling situations.
In Smith, four persons formed a corporation to construct certain
housing units.63  When the corporation was formed, the participants
included provisions in the articles and bylaws stating that any pro-
posed action by the shareholders, directors, or officers, required the
assent of the holders of eighty percent of the corporate stock." This
supermajority provision had the practical effect of requiring unanimous
consent since each shareholder had sufficient stock ownership to block
any proposal. 5
The corporation was successful, but a problem arose because the
defendant Wolfson's outside income was much greater than that of
his fellow shareholders. 6 Thus, distributions of income from the cor-
poration were not beneficial to him because he did not need the money
as much as the others and he would pay a greater percentage of such
distributions in taxes because he was in a high tax bracket. Wolfson's
intransigence caused the corporation to accumulate substantial retained
earnings. Consequently, either a plan for the use of the earnings or
a distribution to shareholders was necessary to avoid imposition of
a penalty tax.67 Wolfson wanted to utilize the excess cash to improve
P.2d at 1089. This premise was borne out by the Zidell decision as defendants prevailed after
presenting evidence of plausible business reasons for their decision. The Zidell court seemed
oblivious to the peculiarities of a closely held corporation. Zidell is an example of the approach
to internal disputes between shareholders in a closely held corporation that existed in most
jurisdictions prior to Donahue. On the other hand, in Alaska Plastics, Inc. v. Coppock, 621
P.2d 270 (Alaska 1980), the Supreme Court of Alaska adopted the Donahue approach to close-
ly held corporations. In Alaska Plastics, the majority shareholders constituted the entire board
of directors. They paid themselves directors fees, but never paid dividends to the shareholders.
The court stated that if these fees were really disguised dividends, then the minority shareholder
must be allowed to participate equally in their distribution under the Donahue "equal oppor-
tunity" approach. 621 P.2d at 277.
61. See also Hallahan v. Haltom Corp., 7 Mass. App. Ct. 68, 385 N.E.2d 1033, 1034-35
(1979), in which the court applied the Wilkes analysis to a similar squeeze out.
62. 12 Mass. App. Ct. 201, 422 N.E.2d 798 (1981).
63. Id. at 202, 422 N.E.2d at 799.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 207-08 n.8, 422 N.E.2d at 802 n.8.
67. See id. at 203, 422 N.E.2d at 800. The accumulated earnings tax is a penalty imposed
on corporations accumulating earnings that exceed the reasonably anticipated needs of the
business. See I.R.C. §§531-537 (1982). This tax is imposed to deter individuals from forming
a corporation and unreasonably retaining earnings within the corporation because the marginal
tax rates for corporations are lower than those for individuals. See B. BrrrKaR & J. EusTIcE,
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS, 8.01 at 8-2 (1979); compare
I.R.C. §1 (1982) (individual income tax) with I.R.C. §11 (1982) (corporate income tax). This
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 16
corporate property.6 The other shareholders, however, wanted to
distribute the earnings because they needed the cash and they were
in lower tax brackets. 9
The shareholders could not reach an agreement, and, because of
the supermajority vote requirement, Wolfson was able to veto the
distribution.7" Eventually, the penalty tax was imposed, and the other
shareholders brought suit, claiming that Wolfson had breached his
fiduciary duty by vetoing the proposed distribution and thereby caus-
ing the corporation to incur the tax.7"
The Smith court, therefore, was asked to extend the Donahue con-
cept to a minority shareholder.7" The court held that the Donahue
doctrine applied. The court stated that because of the eighty percent
requirement, the minority "becomes an ad hoc controlling interest.""
The court reasoned that heightened fiduciary duties should be imposed
on the minority in this context. The court then proceeded to utilize
the balancing test developed in Wilkes74 and concluded that Wolfson
should be held liable because his actions were not based on a legitimate
corporate reason.75 This result seemed inevitable because the trial court
had found that Wolfson's refusal to vote for dividends was based
on tax avoidance and ill will toward fellow shareholders.76
Extension of the concept of heightened fiduciary duties to minori-
ty shareholders is tenuous. In applying Donahue to the minority, the
Smith court focused on the power given to the minority under a super-
majority vote requirement. 77 Extending Donahue even under these cir-
cumstances, however, is debatable. Donahue rested on the assump-
tion that the majority, through control of the machinery of a closely
held corporation, could inflict great harm on a minority shareholder
who was likely to have a substantial percentage of his wealth tied
penalty may be avoided either by distributing the earnings, which depletes accumulated earn-
ings of the corporation, or by development of a plan detailing the reasons why accumulated
earnings are necessary to satisfy the reasonable needs of the business. See I.R.C. §537 (1982).
68. Wolfson wished to reinvest the earnings in the corporation, but his proposal was not
certain enough to satisfy the Internal Revenue Service. 12 Mass. App. Ct. at 203, 422 N.E.2d
at 800 (1981).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See id.
72. The court in Donahue had suggested that this was a possibility. See 367 Mass. 578,
593 n.17, 328 N.E.2d 505, 515 n.17 (1975).
73. 12 Mass. App. Ct. 201, 207, 422 N.E.2d 798, 802 (1981).
74. Id. at 208, 422 N.E.2d at 802.
75. See id. at 209, 422 N.E.2d at 803.
76. Id. at 203, 422 N.E.2d at 800.
77. See infra note 106 and accompanying text for a discussion of the ramifications of
extending fiduciary duties to minority shareholders because of a high vote requirement and
of the other situations in which this extension should occur.
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up in the corporation and who would be unable to sell his interest
because no market existed for his stock.7" Wilkes represents the classic
illustration of how majority control of corporate machinery can abuse
the minority shareholder. Even when a supermajority vote require-
ment exists, however, the power of the minority shareholder is not
overwhelming. He has, for instance, no power to initiate actions or
schemes which may harm the majority, and his veto power is the
same as that of any other shareholder. In reality, the minority
shareholder does not constitute an ad hoc majority.
In Smith, for example, Wolfson had no greater power than any
of the other three shareholders. Wolfson's goals for corporate earn-
ings differed from those of his fellow shareholders because of his
high income and tax bracket. Moreover, although his motives may
have been selfish, Wolfson's desire to reinvest corporate earnings was
as reasonable as the desire of the other shareholders to distribute them.
The court, therefore, should not have held that Wolfson breached
a fiduciary duty to the other shareholders even though his position
was motivated by personal concerns as long as some corporate justifica-
tion existed for his position. Why should the desires of the majority,
which were also motivated by selfishness, be given precedence over
his? The answer must be in Wolfson's failure to advance any cor-
porate justification for his actions.79 Any corporate justification for
retention of earnings should have been enough to prevent him from
being held liable. The shareholders' stand-off is a natural consequence
of the decision to employ a supermajority voting requirement, and
they must all suffer the resulting consequences."0 Once the stand-off
occurs, pointing the finger at one shareholder because he has exercised
his voting rights is not a solution; rather, the use of dispute resolu-
tion mechanisms, such as arbitration, is proper.8"
78. See supra notes 26-35 and accompanying text.
79. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
80. Although high vote requirements are an effective way to protect a minority shareholder
in a closely held corporation, the use of this tool can lead to deadlocks that ultimately can
paralyze the corporation. See, e.g., Benintendi v. Kenton Hotel, Inc., 294 N.Y. 112, 119, 60
N.E.2d 829, 831 (1945) ("prima facie in all acts done by a corporation, the major number
must bind the lesser, or else differences could never be determined."). See also Kaplan v. Block,
183 Va. 327, 335-36, 31 S.E.2d 893, 896-97 (1944).
81. Deadlocks are much more likely to arise in closely held corporations than in publicly
held corporations. High vote requirements often employed in many closely held corporations
lead to deadlocks when shareholders cannot agree. Even in closely held corporations without
high vote requirements, stock ownership often is divided evenly between two shareholders or
shareholder groups, which means that disagreements turn into deadlocks. For this reason,
deadlock-breaking devices are an important planning tool for a closely held corporation.
Arbitration is recommended widely and probably is the most common of these tools. Field,
Resolving Shareholder Disputes and Breaking Deadlocks in the Close Corporation, 58 MNNm.
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Smith represents the extreme case. When high vote requirements
are imposed, each shareholder is a fiduciary because each can use
the veto to exercise control over the corporation. This control will
impact substantially on fellow shareholders if the Donahue assump-
tions, that each shareholder has a significant percentage of his wealth
invested in the corporation and that this wealth cannot be easily ex-
tracted from the enterprise, are accepted. Nevertheless, because no
one minority shareholder possesses any greater power than the other
shareholders, the fiduciary duty of a minority shareholder should be
less than that imposed on a majority shareholder. The court should
not require that the actions of a minority shareholder be more
reasonable than those of his fellow shareholders, but only that they
be reasonable. In other words, the defendant-minority shareholder
should prevail if he presents some reasonable corporate justification
for his actions. Smith, therefore, was correctly decided only because
Wolfson failed to show any reasonable corporate basis for vetoing
the distribution of corporate earnings. The fiduciary duties owed by
participants in closely held corporations become paramount when bat-
tles for control occur.
FIDUCIARY DUTIES IN THE CONTEXT OF QUESTS FOR CONTROL
Control of a closely held corporation can be of paramount impor-
tance to the participants. Essentially, the person in control can operate
the enterprise as though he were a sole proprietor even though he
did not provide all of the capital required for the venture. Conse-
quently, battles for control, frequently occur within closely held cor-
porations. These fights for control arise in a variety of factual pat-
terns. Each of these fact patterns will be examined and the devices
utilized by the person seeking control will be analyzed in the context
of the fiduciary duties owed to each other by participants in closely
held corporations.
A. Failure to Exercise the Corporation's Right of First Refusal
in Order to Gain Control of the Corporation
The validity of using the corporate machinery to cause the cor-
L. REv. 985, 993-94 (1974). Two other deadlock-breaking devices are also common. One is
a buy-out provision triggered by deadlock. Id. at 988-91; Saliterman, Dissolution and Buy-out
Provisions as Potential Solutions for Close Corporation Dissension, 1974 UTAH L. REV. 38,
44-45 (1974). The other is dissolution conditioned upon deadlock. Id. at 42-44. In some jurisdic-
tions, statutory authority for dissolution upon deadlock now exists. See, e.g., Bus. Corp. Act
of 1983, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, §12 50(b)(1) (Smith-Hurd 1984).
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poration to reject an option to repurchase the stock of a selling
shareholder in order to gain control is examined in the cases of Boss
v. Boss8" and Lash v. Lash Furniture Company of Barre, Inc.83 In
both of these cases, repurchase by the corporation would have pre-
served the proportionate interests of the remaining shareholders. The
failure to exercise the option, however, allowed the defendant to pur-
chase the selling shareholder's stock and gain control of the
corporation.
Boss v. Boss presented an unusual situation in which three members
of the Boss family and a fourth person, George Brown, owned all
of the outstanding shares of the A.T. Cross Pencil Company. s" Ethel
Boss's interest consisted of a life interest in sixty shares that were
to be divided equally between her son, Walter, and her stepson, Ellery,
upon her death.85 Walter presently owned three shares, while Ellery
owned two.86 Brown owned six shares, but wanted to sell four of
them. 7
The shares were subject to a right of first refusal by the
corporation. 8 If the corporation failed to exercise the option, Brown
planned to sell the shares to Walter. 9 This transaction was impor-
tant because if the shares were sold to Walter, he would have had
, majority interest in the corporation after his mother's death. If the
corporation exercised the option, Brown would continue to be the
swing vote and neither Waiter nor Ellery would have had a controlling
interest in the corporation. When the question of whether to exercise
the option was voted upon by the directors, Walter abstained, Ellery
82. 98 R.I. 146, 200 A.2d 231 (1964).
83. 130 Vt. 517, 296 A.2d 207 (1972).
84. 98 R.I. 146, 147, 200 A.2d 231, 232-33 (1964).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 147, 200 A.2d at 232.
87. Id. at 147, 200 A.2d at 233.
88. Id.
89. Id.; see supra note 29 for a discussion of share transfer restrictions. Litigation in the
Boss case would have been avoided if the share transfer restriction in question had been drafted
properly. Giving the corporation a right of first refusal or option to purchase shares before
they could be sold to a third party was a good planning technique. Purchase by the corpora-
tion would have caused the proportionate interests of the remaining shareholders to remain
the same and would have stopped the shares from falling into the hands of an unwanted outsider.
Successive options, however, should have been provided in the event the corporation failed
to exercise the first option. Initially, a second option to the remaining shareholders in propor-
tion to their respective interests and operative only if the corporation failed to exercise the
first option, should have been provided. If, however, one of the remaining shareholders failed
to exercise his portion of the second option, proper drafting required a third option in favor
of other shareholders in proportion to their respective interests in the corporation. Otherwise,
the possibility that some of the shares would be sold to an outsider still existed. In Boss, such
draftsmanship would have precluded Walter from purchasing all four shares in the event the
corporation failed to exercise the option and the lawsuit could have been avoided.
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voted in favor of exercising the option and Ethel voted against the
exercise." The decision was passed on to the shareholders because
of the director deadlock. At this level, the option was rejected because
Ethel and Walter voted their shares against the exercise of the op-
tion, while Ellery voted his in favor of the exercise. 91
Ellery sought to enjoin Walter from purchasing the four shares and
to require the corporation to purchase them instead. 92 The trial court
granted the requested injunction. 93 The Supreme Court of Rhode Island
reversed, however, holding that although directors do have fiduciary
duties to the corporation, and presumably to the shareholders who
own it, 94 no decision was made at that level. The court further stated
that the shareholders were free to vote their shares as they pleased
since they owed no fiduciary duties to one another. 95 The court
therefore refused to scrutinize even minimally the reasons of the ma-
jority for voting to reject the option. The Boss court thus accepted
the traditional notion that shareholders of a corporation may act in
their own self-interests without regard to the interests of the corpora-
tion or other shareholders. 96
The use of the Donahue-Wilkes analysis in Boss would have been
appropriate because the majority utilized the corporate machinery to
reject the option and thereby assure continued control after Ethel's
death. If the court had applied the Donahue-Wilkes analysis in Boss,
the results of that case might have been different. The majority
shareholders, Ethel and Walter, would have been required to
demonstrate some legitimate corporate justification for their decision
to cause the corporation to reject the option to purchase Brown's
shares. Perhaps they could have done so based on the price of the
shares, the financial situation of the corporation, or an array of other
conceivable factors. The court, however, most likely would have viewed
with skepticism any justification offered by the majority because Walter
apparently purchased the shares at the same price at which they were
offered to the corporation.97
90. 98 R.I. at 148, 200 A.2d at 233.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 149, 200 A.2d at 234.
93. Id. at 147, 200 A.2d at 232.
94. Id. at 152, 200 A.2d at 235.
95. Id. at 152-53, 200 A.2d at 235.
96. Sneed, The Stockholder May Vote As He Pleases: Theory and Fact, 22 U. Pitt. L.
REV. 23, 25 (1960).
97. The remainder of the Wilkes test is inapplicable here because the harmful activity of
the majority was inaction-failure to exercise the option-as opposed to action-the firing
of Wilkes in Wilkes. The less harmful alternative branch of the Wilkes test, therefore, would
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Lash v. Lash Furniture Company of Barre, Inc.98 was the other
case in which the defendant caused the corporation to reject an op-
tion to purchase a selling shareholder's shares in order to buy them
himself and obtain control of the corporation. In Lash, the three Lash
brothers, Wallace, Ralph, and Herman, each had a one-third interest
in a family corporation.9 Wallace desired to sell his shares and ar-
ranged a tentative sale to Ralph."' The shares, however, were sub-
ject to a right of first refusal by the corporation.' 0' When the trans-
action was voted upon, Wallace abstained and Ralph and Herman
were divided on the question of whether the corporation should exercise
the option.'0 2 No authorization to exercise the option was forthcoming,
therefore, and Ralph was free to purchase Wallace's shares and obtain
control of the corporation.
Herman sued and both the trial court and Supreme Court of Ver-
mont ruled in his favor, requiring that Wallace's stock be transferred
to the corporation.0 3 The Lash court, in a decision diametrically op-
posed to that of the Boss court, stated that Ralph's interest in ultimate-
ly purchasing the stock conflicted with his duty to the corporation
to evaluate the offer objectively, and therefore he was barred from
voting.' 0 While the Boss court did not go far enough in protecting
the rights of shareholders in a closely held corporation, the Lash court
went too far. The Lash court failed to consider any evidence justify-
ing Ralph's decision to vote against the exercise of the option. Under
the Donahue-Wilkes analysis, the defendant-shareholder is at least ac-
corded the opportunity to justify his actions. Another potential criticism
of the analysis by the Lash court was that Ralph was not a majority
shareholder. Rather, he and Herman possessed the same amount of
control over the corporation." 5 This second potential criticism of Lash,
however, is not well-founded. Ralph's vote was needed for the op-
tion to be exercised; this made him the "ad hoe" majority in the
same sense that Wolfson was an "ad hoc" majority in the Smith
not apply. Ellery nevertheless certainly would be given the opportunity to point out why the
business justification offered by the majority was not legitimate, but rather a subterfuge.
98. 130 Vt. 517, 296 A.2d 207 (1972).
99. Id. at 519, 296 A.2d at 209.
100. Id. at 519-20, 296 A.2d at 209.
101. Id. at 519, 296 A.2d at 209.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 520, 296 A.2d at 210.
104. Id.
105. Of course, Herman's vote to exercise the option was as tainted with self-interest as
was Ralph's vote to reject it. The exercise of the option by the corporation would have precluded
Ralph from buying the shares and obtaining control of the corporation.
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case.'06 Therefore, since this situation clearly involved a closely held
corporation, Ralph should have been subject to the same heightened
fiduciary duties that were imposed on Wolfson in the Smith case.
In other words, he should have been required to justify his reasons
for voting to reject the repurchase option. If he had met this burden,
however, no liability should have existed because, as previously in-
dicated, he did not have a controlling interest in the corporation and,
therefore, the court should not require his actions to be more
reasonable than the actions of the other shareholders. 7 Lash may
have been decided properly, but Ralph should have been given the
opportunity to justify his actions.' 08
In summary, neither the Boss nor the Lash analysis was correct.
The Donahue-Wilkes test should have been employed, and although
the results might not have differed in either case, at least the com-
peting interests of the parties would have been accorded the protec-
tion to which they were entitled.'0 9 Fiduciary duties also may be in-
volved when transactions occur between shareholders.
106. See supra notes 62-81 and accompanying text. The ramifications of extending the Smith
analysis to the Lash situation are far-reaching. The logical conclusion of this extension is that
any time a minority shareholder's vote is decisive, he owes fiduciary duties to his fellow
shareholders. Alternatively, a minority shareholder always owes fiduciary duties to his fellow
shareholders, but these duties are apparent only when his vote is critical to a determination
of an issue. When a unanimity requirement exists, a minority shareholder's vote is always critical
because he can veto the proposed action. Other critical circumstances exist, such as when a
sufficient number of other shareholders abstain or fail to attend the meeting or when the other
shareholders are divided evenly on a question. The extension of Smith to each of these
circumstances is warranted, because in each of them the minority shareholder has control over
the corporate machinery through his ability to decide the issue. Thus, as with Wolfson in Smith.
the minority shareholder controls the wealth of his fellow shareholders in each of these instances.
107. See supra text accompanying notes 81-82.
108. See also Hallahan v. Haltom Corp., 7 Mass. App. Ct. 68, 385 N.E.2d 1033 (1979),
supra note 61, in which one group of shareholders, the Thompsons, squeezed out the other
group, the Hallahans, by terminating their employment without showing a reasonable business
justification for so doing. The squeeze out was possible because a small number of shares
had been issued to a cousin of the Thompsons, giving the Thompsons a majority interest in
the corporation. The Hallahans were aware of the issuance of these shares but thought that
control of the corporation still would be divided equally between the two groups. To remedy
the squeeze out, the court of appeals required the corporation to repurchase the cousin's shares.
The repurchase thus "restored the balance of control among the Hallahans and Thompsons
which the trial judge found the parties had envisioned and which they had a fiduciary duty
to each other to maintain." Id. at 69, 385 N.E.2d at 1034.
109. Use of the corporate machinery to obtain control takes other forms. For instance,
in Schwartz v. Marien, 37 N.Y.2d 487, 335 N.E.2d 334, 373 N.Y.S.2d 122 (1975), two families
each owned fifty percent of the shares of a closely held corporation and had two members
on the board of directors. A board member of the plaintiff group died, allowing the defendant
group to fill the vacancy with an associate. The defendants thereafter used their control at
the board level to cause the corporation to issue treasury shares to themselves and two key
employees. The remaining member of the plaintiff group brought suit to require that she be
permitted to purchase sufficient shares to maintain her proportionate ownership of the cor-
poration. The court noted the tremendous adverse affect the issuance of the treasury shares
had on plaintiff, whose equality of ownership of the closely held corporation was disturbed.
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B. Fiduciary Duties with Respect to Transactions Between
Shareholders
Several cases have involved stock transactions between shareholders
in a closely held corporation. These transactions affect control of the
enterprise, but unlike Boss and Lash, the use of corporate machinery
is not involved. Rather, control hinges upon transactions between two
shareholders of the corporation. The question remains whether any
duties are owed to the nonparticipating shareholders whose share in
the control of the corporation is affected by the transfer. The results
differ in two reported cases.
In Johns v. Caldwell,"' the stock of the corporation was owned
by three persons. Plaintiff Johns and defendant Caldwell owned forty-
five percent of the stock, defendant Moore owned the remaining ten
percent."' From the inception of the corporation, Johns and Caldwell
operated and controlled the enterprise to the exclusion of Moore. '
Moore never was an officer and was removed as a director by Johns
and Caldwell after serving for several years on the board." 3 Moore,
furthermore, did not receive a return on his investment because
dividends were not paid by the corporation and he did not draw a
salary." 4 Tired of this situation, Moore offered his shares to Caldwell,
who agreed to purchase them." 5 This transaction would have given
Caldwell a majority interest in the corporation. When Johns found
out about the transaction, he brought suit to prevent the transfer or,
alternatively, to require equal division of Moore's stock between himself
and Caldwell. ' 6 Johns' suit was based on the theory that the three
shareholders had a confidential relationship that required Moore's stock
to be equally divided between the remaining shareholders."17 Johns
argued that his relationship with Caldwell and Moore was analogous
The court then fashioned a test similar to that later developed by the Wilkes court to ascertain
the permissibility of defendants' actions. The court stated that the defendants must show that
the issuance was done to achieve a bona fide business objective and that such "objective could
not have been accomplished substantially as effectively by other means which would not have
disturbed the proportionate stock ownership." Id. at 492, 335 N.E.2d at 338, 373 N.Y.S.2d
at 127. The court further stated that if the evidence showed that the stock was issued to advance
an independent corporate interest and also to place the complaining shareholder at a disadvan-
tage, then the defendants had to show that no other means were available to accomplish the
legitimate corporation objective. Id. at 493, 335 N.E.2d at 338, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 128.
110. 601 S.W.2d 37 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980).
111. Id. at 39.
112. Id. at 40.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 39.
117. Id.
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to a partnership relationship and that therefore his fellow shareholders
owed to him the same fiduciary duties that partners owe to each
other."1 8 His arguments failed at both the trial and appellate court
levels. 1 9
The Johns court took the position that any analogy to fiduciary
duties of partners was not appropriate because the participants had
chosen to operate their business as a corporation.' This analysis,
however, elevated form over substance. The internal relationships of
shareholders in a closely held corporation are precisely the same as
partners of a general partnership.' 2'
In discussing the restrictions that exist on transferability of shares, 22
the court did not distinguish between closely held and public corpora-
tions. The court concluded, therefore, that the only restrictions
on share transfers were based on prohibitions against insider trading. ,21
The majority rule regarding insider trading, which states that a direc-
tor or officer of a corporation is free to buy and sell shares in that
corporation as long as he does not "affirmatively act or speak
wrongfully or intentionally conceal facts with reference to it,"'J4
was applied. The court found no affirmative misrepresentations
with respect to this transaction, which was allowed to stand.
118. Id. at 41.
119. Id. at 46.
120. Id. at 41.
121. See, e.g., Donahue, 367 Mass. 578, 586, 328 N.E.2d 505, 512 (1975); 68th Street Apts.,
Inc. v. Lauricella, 142 N.J. Super. 546, 560, 362 A.2d 78, 86 (1976).
122. Johns, 601 S.W.2d 37, 41-42 (1980).
123. Id. at 42.
124. Id. Three rules were developed at common law with respect to insider trading. The
first, known as the majority rule, states that an "insider," such as a director or officer of
a corporation, owes no duty of disclosure to those with whom he trades (shareholders or potential
shareholders of the corporation) and will incur no liability unless he affirmatively misrepresents
material facts concerning the transaction. Treadway Companies, Inc. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d
357, 375 (2d Cir. 1980) (applying New Jersey law). The second common law approach to insider
trading is known as the "special facts" rule. Under this rule, no duty of disclosure exists on
the part of the insider except under special circumstances or facts that make withholding the
information inequitable. See Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909). These special facts might
include, among others, the special trust and confidence that the plaintiff has placed in the
insider or the higher level of business skill of the insider. See Jaynes v. Jaynes, 98 Cal. App.
2d 447, 453, 220 P.2d 598, 602 (1950); Lazenby v. Godwin, 40 N.C. App. 487, 494, 253 S.E.2d
489, 493 (1979). The third common law approach to insider trading is what is known as the
"minority rule," which requires the insider to disclose all material facts about the transaction
to the person with whom he is trading. See, e.g., Hotchkiss v. Fischer, 136 Kan. 530, 16 P.2d
531 (1932). See generally Taylor v. Wright, 69 Cal. App. 2d 371, 159 P.2d 980 (1945) (discus-
sion of these concepts). Most commentators agree that the "majority rule" now is followed
by a minority of jurisdictions and that either the special facts or minority rule is followed
by most jurisdictions today. H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAW OF CORPORATIONS §239, at 646
n.4 (3d ed. 1983). Much of the litigation involving insider trading occurs in actions not brought
under the common law, but rather under Rule lOb-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
See Dirks v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983) (analyzing insider
trading under Rule lOb-5).
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This entire analysis based on notions of insider trading was ill-
founded. The objecting party was not privy to the transaction, and
restrictions on insider trading are only designed to protect a party
to a transaction from the person with whom he is trading. 2 Once
the analogy to insider trading was employed, therefore, the conclusion
of the court in Johns was foregone.
A contrary result was reached in Cressy v. Shannon Continental
Corporation.'26 As in Johns, the initial premise of the court deter-
mined the outcome of the case. In Cressy, Cressy and Russell formed
a corporation in which they each purchased 425 shares of stock. Other
individuals also received stock in return for professional services per-
formed for the corporation.' 27 Notwithstanding the issuance of shares
to the professionals, the court still found that Cressy and Russell had
agreed to be "fifty-fifty partners."'28 Several years after the forma-
tion of the corporation, additional shares were issued to Russell's
parents.' 29 Soon thereafter, one of the professionals, DeFries, sold
his stock to Cressy.'3 ° After these events, the equal ownership interests
of the two controlling shareholders had been altered, and each sued
the other to enjoin consummation of the transaction that caused him
to lose equality in ownership.'
Unlike the Johns court, the Cressy court stated that shareholders
in a closely held corporation, like partners, have fiduciary duties to
one another.'32 The Cressy court then stated that these duties of dealing
"fairly, honestly and openly"' 33 with one another included the duty
to maintain equal ownership and control of the business if that was
the expectation of the parties."' Finding this expectation, the court
then gave credence to the implied understanding of the parties and
restored equal stock ownership to the two main shareholders.' 35
The initial premises of the Cressy and Johns courts were contrary
to one another and dictated the result in each case. Neither court,
125. See, e.g., Conant, Duties of Disclosure of Corporate Insiders Who Purchase Shares,
46 CORNELL L.Q. 53, 59 (1960). Professor Conant noted: "The minority rule courts state that
the officer and director ... must disclose every material fact he knows about the corporation's
activities to the shareholder who is about to sell shares to him." Id. (emphasis added).
126. 378 N.E.2d 941 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978).
127. Id. at 943.
128. Id. at 943 n.2.
129. Id. at 944.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 945.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 946.
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furthermore, referred to the analysis in Donahue in reaching the deci-
sion. Freedom to buy and sell shares, with only a few limitations
on the methods that could be used, 3 ' was the conservative premise
of the Johns decision. Followers of this approach would argue that
if restrictions were desired, they should have been placed in a
shareholders agreement. Because the shareholders had not done so,
the transfer was permissible. The Cressy court, on the other hand,
* reached fairly easily the conclusion that the shareholders of a closely
held corporation are similar to partners and, therefore, if an implied
understanding of equal ownership exists, it should be given credence.
Application of the Donahue analysis is helpful in ascertaining which
view is correct. First, the heightened fiduciary duties required of the
majority, either real or ad hoc, by the Donahue court are based on
the assumption that majority misuse of the corporate machinery has
a great effect on the minority. This is because the minority has a
great stake in the venture and because it is unable to extricate itself
from an unfavorable or oppressive situation due to the nonexistence
of a market for its stock. 37 Stock transactions between shareholders,
however, do not involve misuse of the corporate machinery because
the corporate machinery is not used at all. Moreover, these situations
never involve an oppressive majority because a shareholder with an
already-existing majority interest will not attempt to purchase more
shares.
As recognized by the Donahue court itself, therefore, the justifica-
tions it utilized to give rise to heightened fiduciary duties are not ap-
plicable to transactions between shareholders that do not involve the
corporate machinery.138
The analogy to partnerships, therefore, is the only rationale for
requiring each shareholder's share in the control of the corporation
be protected from change due to stock transactions between
shareholders. Unquestionably, the analogy between close corporations
and partnerships is a sound one.' 39 The relationships between par-
ticipants in each of these ventures are precisely the same. The only
real distinction involves the decision to incorporate the business, and
this decision is usually made on advice of attorney, based on tax con-
siderations and the advantages of limited liability of shareholders.
Moreover, fiduciary duties should be imposed in both situations
136. See supra notes 109-24 and accompanying text.
137. See supra notes 26-35 and accompanying text.
138. Donahue, 367 Mass. 578, 593 n.18, 328 N.E.2d 505, 515 n.18 (1975).
139. See supra note 121 for cases upholding the analogy.
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because intimate business ventures such as these demand trust among
the participants in order to succeed. Extending these duties to include
the requirement that continuing proportionate interests be maintained
is sensible. To place each participant on guard to protect his propor-
tionate interest against transfers by fellow shareholders is inimical to
the interests of the participants and the enterprise in general. Cressy,
therefore, was decided correctly, even though it represents a substan-
tial extension of the heightened fiduciary duty concept of Donahue. °
The Johns court, on the other hand, simply ignored the characteristics
that differentiate a closely held corporation from larger, public
corporations.
CONCLUSION
The Donahue case was well reasoned and correctly decided because
the Donahue court profoundly grasped the peculiarities of life in a
closely held corporation. Moreover, the refinement of Donahue, by
introduction of a balancing test in Wilkes, further represents insightful
decision making. The analysis contained in these two cases applies
to any activity in a closely held corporation in which the use of the
corporate machinery harms the minority.
In addition, extending the majority shareholder's fiduciary duties
to a minority shareholder whose action determines the outcome of
an issue is logical. The minority shareholder in these situations con-
trols the corporate machinery. Because the minority shareholder, unlike
the majority shareholder, cannot initiate corporate actions, however,
the duties imposed upon him should not be as great as those imposed
upon a majority shareholder.
The only situation in which the Donahue analysis is not appropriate
is when the shareholders act outside of the corporate context. A
140. The heightened fiduciary concept arguably should apply to a transaction in which a
majority shareholder sells his shares to a third party. In Clagett v. Hutchison, 583 F.2d 1259
(4th Cir. 1978), plaintiff argued that under the Donahue "equal opportunity" rule, the majority
shareholder has a fiduciary duty to the minority shareholders "to afford them an equal oppor-
tunity to sell their minority shares or a pro rata part of their shares to the purchaser of the
controlling stock on the same or substantially the same terms and conditions as were offered
to [the majority]." Id. at 1263. Plaintiff's argument was rejected. Application of the rule,
said the Clagett court, "would likely result in the stifling of many financial transactions due
either to a purchaser's inability to purchase the additional shares, or from a lack of inclination
to purchase those shares." Id. at 1264. Clagett was decided correctly. Application of the Donahue
"equal opportunity" concept to the type of transaction involved in Clagett is not appropriate.
In Donahue, the "equal opportunity" was held to exist because the majority, through control
of the corporate machinery, created a market for shares and caused an unequal distribution
of the corporate assets to itself. When a third party offers to purchase a majority shareholder's
stock, no use of the corporate machinery and no unequal distribution of corporate assets are
present because the corporation is not the purchaser of the stock.
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shareholder's potential control over the corporate machinery, the basis
for heightened fiduciary duties in Donahue, is irrelevant in these situa-
tions. To impose fiduciary duties when shareholders do not act in
a corporate context, an analogy must be drawn between shareholders
in a closely held corporation and partners in a partnership. This
analogy is a sound one, and the fiduciary duties of partners should
be considered in determining whether the activities of the defendant-
shareholder are permissible when corporate machinery is not used.
